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I.
Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals I define a current account reversal as a reduction in the current account deficit of at least 4% of GDP in one year. A sudden stop, on the other hand, is defined as an abrupt and major reduction in capital inflows to a country that has been receiving large volumes of foreign capital. In particular, a sudden stop occurs when net capital inflows have declined by at least 5% of GDP in one year (see Edwards 2004 for details 
II. Openness and the Costs of Current Account Reversals
I use the data set described above to investigate two issues: (a) Does the probability of experiencing a current account reversal depend on the country's degree of financial openness? And (b), do the effects of current account reversals on real economic activity (GDP growth) depend on the country's degree of trade and financial openness?
1 Some authors have argued that "excessive" capital mobility is highly disruptive.
According to them, restricting the degree of capital mobility will reduce the probability that a country faces an external crisis, including a sudden stop and a current account reversal (Joseph Stiglitz 2002) . Whether this is indeed the case is, of course, an empirical issue. The results reported in this paper, then, shed some light on this policy question, as they provide a historical assessment of the effectiveness of capital controls.
In a number of models the costs of foreign shocks -including sudden stops and current account reversals --are inversely proportional to the country's degree of openness. In Mundell-Fleming type of models the expenditure reducing effort, for any given level of expenditure switching, is inversely proportional to the marginal propensity to import. In these models adjustment costs are also inversely proportional to the degree of financial integration. Countries with a higher degree of financial openness will require a smaller reduction in aggregate income to accommodate external shocks than countries with a lower degree of financial integration (Jacob Frenkel and Assaf Razin 1987 (2000), for example, concluded that "reversal… are not systematically associated with a growth slowdown (p. 303)." Edwards (2002) , on the other hand, used dynamic panel regressions and concluded that major current account reversals had a negative effect on investment, and on GDP per capita growth, even after controlling for investment. Neither of these papers, however, analyzed the interaction between openness or the exchange rate regime, and the costs of current account reversals.
A. The Empirical Model
I use a "treatment effects" model to estimate jointly an equation on real GDP growth and a probit equation on the probability of a current account reversal.
(1) g* j = φ + x j β + ω j .
(2)
Equation (1) is a long run growth equation. g* j is long run real per capita GDP growth in country j; x j is a vector of covariates that capture the role of traditional determinants of growth, and ω j is an error term. Equation (2) is a growth dynamics equation, where [ g* j -g t-1 j ] is a partial adjustment term (the "growth gap"), v t j is a terms of trade shock, and δ t j is a dummy variable (i.e. the treatment variable) that takes a value of one if country j in period t experienced a current account reversal, and zero if the country did not experience a reversal. Thus, γ is the parameter of interest: the effect of the treatment on the outcome. Finally, (δ t j Openness t j ) is a variable that interacts δ t j with a measure of openness. Whether the country experiences a current account reversal is assumed to be the result of an unobserved latent variable δ* j t , in equation (3). δ* j t , in turn, is assumed to depend on vector w j t . Some of the variables in w j t may be included in x j t .
Exclusionary restrictions are imposed for identification purposes. β and α are parameter vectors. ξ j t and ε j t are error terms assumed to be bivariate normal, with a zero mean and a covariance matrix:
A two-step estimation procedure is used. Equation (1) Thus, countries with stricter capital controls have a lower value of this index. Since I am interested in understanding the role of financial openness in the probability of reversals, one of the w j t in equation (4) is the index of financial integration described above.
In the long run growth equation (1) the dependent variable is real GDP growth per capita. The following covariates were included: the log of initial GDP per capita; the investment ratio; the coverage of secondary education; an index of the degree of openness of the economy; the ratio of government consumption to GDP; and regional dummies. In some specifications I also included an indexes for the exchange rate regime.
Results from the estimation of (1) are not reported due to space constraints.
In the growth equation (2) v t j is the change in the terms of trade, and δ t j is the current account reversals dummy. As stated, I also included the current account reversal dummy interacted with the trade openness variable, and interacted with the financial openness index. If reversals have a negative impact on (short-term) growth, the coefficient of the reversals' dummy will be significantly negative. If this effect is inversely proportional to the country's degree of openness, the coefficients of the interaction between reversals and openness should be significantly positive.
In specifying equation (4) 
B. Results
In Table 1 I The probit estimates are presented in the lower panel of Table 1 . The results are similar across models, most coefficients have the expected signs, and are statistically significant at conventional levels. These results indicate that the probability of experiencing a reversal is higher for countries with a large (lagged) current account deficit, a high external debt ratio, a rapid rate of growth of domestic credit, lower initial GDP, and a high occurrence of sudden stops in their region. Countries that have a higher level of net international reserves have a lower probability of experiencing a reversal.
The coefficients of the short-term debt have the expected sign, but tend not to be significant. Particularly important for the subject of this paper, the coefficient of the financial openness index is negative in all regressions, and it is and significantly negative in equation (1.4) for the complete sample. This provides some (weak) evidence suggesting that countries with a higher degree of financial openness have a lower probability of facing a current account reversal. That is, contrary to what has been argued by critics of globalization, these results suggest that the presence of capital account restrictions does not reduce the probability of an external crisis. These results are robust to the sample used, as well as to the specification of the probit equation. A possible explanation is that the public finds way to circumvent the restrictions. In addition, it is possible that in countries with capital controls the authorities become overconfident, and tend to implement more "risky" macroeconomic policies.
The results from the estimation of the growth dynamics equation are reported in Panel A. The growth gap and the terms of trade coefficients have the expected signs and are significant. More importantly, the coefficients of the current account reversal dummy is always significantly negative, and the coefficients of the term that interacts trade openness and reversals is always significantly positive. Thus, the effects of a current account reversal on growth depend significantly on the degree of trade openness of the economy. This result can be illustrated for the case of equation (1.1):
Growth Effects of Reversals = -6.025 + 0.032 trade openness.
The variable "trade openness" varies significantly across countries. Its mean is 65%, its standard deviation is 35%, and its median is 67.4%. The first decile is 28.7%, and the ninth decile is 130.7%. For a country with a degree of openness equal to the mean, the point estimate of the effect of a reversal on GDP growth (relative to trend) is: -3.945% (-6.025 + 0.032 x 65 = -3.945) . If the country's degree of openness is low and equal to the first decile, the effect of a reversal on growth is more negative and equal to -5.11%. But if the country is very open to trade, and its degree of openness corresponds to the ninth decile, the effect of a reversal on growth is much smaller, at -1.84%.
In equations (1.2) and (1.3) the estimated coefficient of the variable that interacts reversals and financial openness is negative but not significant. All in all, these results suggest that of financial openness has no effect on the way in which reversals affect growth. This contrasts with the results in equations (1.1) and (1.4) that indicate that trade openness mitigates the effects of reversals on economic growth.
C. Current Account Reversals and Exchange Rate Regimes
An important question is whether the effects of reversals on growth ( 
III. Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have shown that sudden stops and current account reversals have been closely related. The econometric analysis suggests that restricting capital mobility does not reduce the probability of experiencing a reversal. Current account reversals, in turn, have had a negative effect on real growth that goes beyond their direct effect on investment. The regression analysis indicates that the negative effects of current account reversals on growth will depend on the country's degree of trade openness: More open countries will suffer less -in terms of lower growth relative to trend-than countries with a lower degree of trade openness. On the other hand, the degree of financial openness does not appear to be related to the intensity with which reversals affect real economic performance. The empirical analysis also suggests that countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes are able to accommodate better shocks stemming from a reversal than countries with more rigid exchange rate regimes. In interpreting the findings reported in this paper, it is important to keep in mind that measuring financial integration is far from easy (Quinn 2003) . Further work on the subject should aim at producing even better indexes of financial integration and capital account restrictions. 1,561 Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; (-1) denotes a one-period lagged variable; Countryspecific and year dummies are included as discussed in text, but are not reported. *Significant at 10%;** significant at 5%.
